We develop a dynamic discrete choice model of a self-interested and unchecked ruler making decisions regarding the development of a resource rich country. Resource wealth serves as collateral and facilitates the acquisition of loans. The ruler makes the recursive choice of either staying in power to live o the productivity of the country while facing the risk of being ousted, or looting the country's riches by liquefying the natural assets through external lending. We show that 1) unstructured lending from international credit markets can enhance the ruler's ability to liquefy assets, and create incentives to loot the country's wealth; and 2) an enhanced likelihood of looting reduces tenures (greater political instability), increases indebtedness, reduces investment, and diminishes growth. We test these predictions using a treatment eects model and nd strong empirical evidence that instability caused by unsound lending to unchecked rulers of resource rich countries may result in slow economic growth. * We would like to thank
Introduction
An extensive literature documents that resource wealth appears to be a curse rather than a blessing for many countries. There are at least three dierent explanations for this so-called resource curse. Resource wealth is seen to be associated with (i) slow growth (e.g., Sachs and Warner 1995), (ii) domestic conict and political instability (e.g., Collier and Hoeer 2004) , and with (iii) autocratic regimes and poor institutions (e.g., Ross 2001 , Isham et al. 2004 ). Traditionally, analysts attempted to explain these phenomena with mono-disciplinary models and perspectives.
For example, economists advanced Dutch disease models and rent seeking to analyze slow growth, and political scientists employed rentier-state models and weak state arguments to explain institutional failure and conict. Increasingly, the inter-relations between the three dimensions of the curse are recognized, and the search is on for unied models that capture the various salient features in one coherent framework.
This paper contributes to that ambitious objective, and aims to pull together the political and economic domain insofar as this is relevant for the relationship between resource wealth and underdevelopment. It starts from the premise that many resource-rich countries hold these resources as national assets (rather than under systems of private property rights). This presents a situation where the ruling party or person taking political control nds itself immediately endowed with substantial resource wealth. Where un-checked, these rulers are often aorded the option of looting their country's riches, rather than investing in the development of the nation. For example, the disastrous economic and political performance of countries such as Nigeria or the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) can be easily traced to the predatory behavior of their autocratic regimes.
A long list of this sort of resource-inspired looting-type behaviour is cited by . But resources do not have to be a curse. There are of course countries where the leaders implement sound development policies from a base of resource-richness. After contrasting the diverging trajectories of countries such as Botswana, DRC, and Indonesia, Dunning (2005) stresses the need for conditional theories of the resource curse. The main challenge is to unravel the conditions under which resource wealth results in development, and those conditions conducive to looting.
We develop the argument here that there is a specic set of institutional failures that combine to present the opportunity for looting: a) relatively undeveloped democratic institutions (an absence of checks on the current ruler); b) nationally held resource rights (centralised economies); and c) relatively unstructured lending (unconditional conferment of liquidity). We are not the rst to point to the importance of institutions in the explanation of the curse. There is plenty of evidence suggesting that institutional quality is one of the main drivers of economic development in general (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001 , Rodrik et al. 2004 , and it has been argued that the fates of resource-rich economies in particular are inuenced by the quality of their institutions (e.g. Robinson et al. 2006 , Mehlum et al. 2005 ). Our point is more subtle. We demonstrate here that it can be a particular sort of interaction between domestic institutional weaknesses (centralised governance and unchecked autocratic decision making) and international institutional weaknesses (unstructured lending conditions) that might explain looting behaviour and contributes to a better understanding of the resource curse.
The international capital market plays a crucial role in our story. We wish to examine in particular how and why excessive resource-based lending by external nancial institutions can induce default, departure and debt in developing countries. This sort of moral hazard in the nancial markets leading to excessive lending to sovereigns has been previously noted. (Bulow 2002 ) We also are not the rst to highlight the roles of international loans and debts in reduced growth. Manzano and Rigobon (2001) nd that the resource curse vanishes when controlling for indebtedness. Their argument is that large credit oered on resource-based collateral in periods of commodity boom resulted in substantial debt overhang when commodity prices fell in the 1980's.
1 The importance of these ndings is reinforced by the observation that 12 of the world's most mineral-dependent countries and six of the world most oil-dependent countries are currently classied as highly indebted poor countries (Weinthal and Luong 2006 ).
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We agree with this analysis, and develop ours to elaborate and expound upon the mechanisms by which resource-based lending goes bad. The most fundamental cause in our story is moral 1 In the 1970s and early 1980s international banks (such as Citicorp and Chase Manhattan) lent vast amounts of money to developing nations based on their natural resources endowment, virtually irrespective of their ability to repay such debts (Sampson 1982) . It is now seen that the boom in resource prices in the 1970s increased the value of in situ resources, aiding the ability of resource-rich economies to attract foreign loans and run up debts.
The absence of productive investment by these resource-rich nations meant that there was signicant indebtedness with little demonstratively positive impact upon growth.
2 Usui (1997) provides a case study on two oil-rich countries Indonesia and Mexico, that supports this argument.
He nds that both Indonesia (in 1975) and Mexico (in 1978 Mexico (in -1982 became attractive customers in the credit market, and took advantage of the drastic improvement of the borrowing capacity during the periods of the boom of their resource sector. This unsound lending and borrowing -also called boom based borrowing capacity -resulted in and we demonstrate how odious debts result from such unstructured lending. Our point here is that the indebtedness and poor performance of these resource-rich economies is as much a result of the poor contracting by the nancial sector as it is the unchecked power and poor institutions within the debtor regimes. It takes negiligence or malfeasance by both the parties to make a bad contract. These bad contracts, together with the weak institutions in the resource-rich nations, create the environment within which non-investment, instability, and debt are generated hence the resource curse.
Our main results are as follows. We rst demonstrate in a simple model how a dictator taking control of a nation's resources might decide between three distinctly dierent paths: (1) immediate looting of the country's resource wealth; (2) transitory investment in the country's capital base to build up additional liquidity for looting in the medium term; or (3) long term investment in the economy (and possibly in shared consumption or political repression) in an attempt to secure tenure and to consume from the economy. Second, we demonstrate the main factors aecting the dictator's choice between these various paths, being: a) the level of external nance available for liquefying resource wealth; b) the indebtedness of the economy; and nally c) the productivity of investments within the economy. After the modelling of the dictator's problem, we provide simulations of the optimal path for such an economy which, under specic conditions (low productivity and high liquidity), is one of recurrent looting -resulting in political instability, low growth and substantial indebtedness. We demonstrate that the same dictator (with lower liquidy or higher security) will pursue a path of optimal investment and high growth -acting more as an owner and less as a looter of the economy. Finally, we provide empirical evidence that corroborates the predictions from our theoretical framework. We nd that the combination of resource wealth and lending in autocratic states are correlated with instability, which in turn is negatively associated with economic growth. This nding suggests that the model points to a channel through which the resource curse may arise.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the stylized growth model of a resourcerich nation with an un-checked ruler who has access to foreign lending. In section 3 we simulate the resource-relevant choices of such an autocrat, and demonstrate the economic outcomes for the nation over a signicant range of parameters. In section 4 we initiate our empirical analysis of resource-rich states, outlining our empirical strategy and introducing our data. In section 5 we present regression results -looking at the relationshp in these states between: a) resources and lending; and b) political instability and economic growth. Section 6 concludes.
The model
We develop a model in which we investigate the eects of natural resource abundance, poor governance and unsound lending on political stability and ultimately on economic performance. Poor governance is present in the form of an unchecked ruler with implicit property rights in the resources of the state. We are interested in how such an autocrat will elect to achieve a payout on these property rights and, in particular, the impact of lending market imperfections upon the dictator's choice between staying and looting. Staying involves the dictator's commitment to acquiring a return through holding power and investing in the economy. Looting involves electing a short term hit and run strategy of maximum loan, minimal investment, and immediate departure.
Before we examine the model, we will rst dene the primary actors existing within the framework.
Autocratic Resource-Rich States. The states concerned hold their xed natural resource stocks directly as sovereign assets; there are no intermediate entities (corporations, individuals) holding rights in these resources. Once in power, the leader of the state has the unchecked authority to mine the resources or to enter into contracts on behalf of the state in regard to the natural resource assets. These natural resources are sunk assets, but are assumed to be capable of providing a constant stream of revenues into the indenite future.
Consider such an autocratic resource-rich state, a small open economy producing output y t according to the function y t = f (k t ) + φZ, where f is a strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously dierentiable function of capital k t and φZ is the ow of resource rents deriving from the state's sunk resource wealth Z. We will assume here that the ow of rents from resources remains constant throughout the program, while the productivity of the economy may be enhanced by means of investment in capital. The capital stock k t evolves according to the transition equation 
The interest on the debt must be paid each period for the banks to accept lending in the next period. So, the cost of servicing the debt rd t is incurred each period that the state is not in default.
External nancial institutions. Foreign nancial institutions make liquidity available to the resource-rich states in recognition of the expected future ows of value from the resource base.
These institutions (primarily the commercial banking sector) recognise the authority of rulers of autocratic resource-rich states to enter into contracts on behalf of the states in regard to these resources, and any contracts entered into by a ruler continue as obligations of that state beyond the individual tenure of that ruler. The commercial banking sector oers liquidity to the current leader contingent upon the state not currently being in default. The amount of liquidity is constrained by an aggregate debt ceiling proportionate to the total resources available.
We are assuming here that international lenders are relying primarily on the anticipated ows from natural resource stocks as implicit collateral for their loans. Natural resources (more specically the so-called point source resources such as oil and minerals) dier from other forms of capital such as physical infrastructure, hospitals, schools or factories in that they can be more readily liqueed by means of bank lending. We capture this notion by assuming that the liquidity parameter θ z for the natural resource is larger than for other forms of capital, θ k , i.e. θ z > θ k ≥0.
Banks recognise that adverse selection can result from price-based lending and so limit lending levels instead. (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981) Credit rationing here is limited by both the immediate and aggregate ows from the resource base available for repayment. (Bulow and Rogo 1989) This means that, so long as the state is not in default (i.e. prior debt is serviced), the lenders are willing to provide a maximum loan amount in any given period in proportion to the total amount of longer term resources available. The rst point indicates that there is a certain proportion of resource-based capital and physical capital that is liqueable in any given period, i.e. 
The Dictator. The ruler of the state concerned is a dictator in that he has unchecked power over the resource wealth and other assets of the state for the duration of his tenure. His problem is to determine how best to appropriate maximum utility from his period of tenure over these resources.
These resources are sunk, in that there is only a xed proportion of the resources realisable in any given period of his tenure. These ows may then be consumed immediately or invested in the productive capacity of the economy which makes them available for future consumption. The ruler can aect the length of his tenure by means of investments in societal betterment (shared consumption) but there remains uncertainty in each period concerning whether the regime will end at that time. With international lending, the ruler has the option of liquefying some additional proportion of the state's resource wealth in any given period, at the cost of an increase in the state's debt at the beginning of the next period.
The Dictator's Problem. These three assumptions are sucient for establishing the structure of our autocrat's choice problem, which is built upon the premise that the ruler is pursuing his own agenda after assuming control of the state. (Acemoglu, et al. 2004) We assume that the self-interested dictator is faced with the problem of maximising his own life-time utility largely by means of making the decision concerning his optimal length of tenure.
where χ t is the dictator's binary choice between staying (χ t = 0) and looting (χ t = 1); and ε t is an unobservable state variable for the analyst.
3 Time is discrete and the dictator faces an innite time horizon.
In each period, the incumbent dictator decides whether to stay in power or to loot the country and leave immediately. His choice resembles that of the manager of a rm who is strategically choosing the point in time of the liquidation of a limited liability corporation. (Mason and Swanson, 1996) The basic decision comes down to whether to abscond with maximum liquidity today, or whether to stay and invest in tenure and productivity in order acquire a return from holding control over the productive capacities of the enterprise in the future.
Here we model the problem recursively. If the dictator decides to stay, he captures part of the benets from production, and then faces the decision regarding looting again in the next period.
By staying, the dictator faces the possibility that he will be ousted, and lose everything along with his loss of control. The decision whether to stay one more period or to loot is a recursive discrete choice problem described by the following equation:
This equation relies on the assumption of additive separability (AS) of the utility function between observed and unobserved state variables. We will also assume that 1) ε t follows an extreme value distribution; and 2) ε t+1 and ε t are independent conditional on the observed state variables k t and d t . These assumptions follow Rust (1987 and 1994) and greatly simplify this complex problem.
The Decision to Retain Control. Given a decision to stay and maintain control, the dictator will choose current period consumption c t , capital level k t+1 , debt level d t+1 and repression level s t to secure his rule. He enjoys an instantaneous utility u(c t ) where u > 0, u > 0 and u < 0, and expected stream of future utilities should he remain in power. He decides the investment level in productive capital each period by choosing k t+1 according to the following law of motion:
3 The state variables k t and d t are observable unlike ε t .
where s t measures the repression level chosen by the dictator (e.g. expenditures on secret services, police and army) and cost(s t ) are the associated costs.
Within each period t, the dictator experiences the realisation of a discrete random variable ξ t = {0, 1}, where ξ t = 1 indicates that the dictator is toppled, and ξ t = 0 indicates that the dictator remains in power. We assume that the realisation of the shock depends both on the choice of next period's capital stock and repression level. This specication captures the idea that both consumption-sharing and military-spending are strategies for maintaining control over the
denote the probability of the dictator being deposed next period given he was in power this period; ρ(k t+1 , s t ) is assumed to be strictly decreasing and strictly convex in both arguments. That is, increased k t+1 and s t decrease the probability of being toppled at a decreasing rate. The idea here is that the dictator may invest in repression to secure his tenure and may also attempt to buy o peace by sharing some of the output with the population (k t+1 ). This dilemma has also been analyzed by Azam (1995) . The recursive problem faced by the dictator does not depend on time per se, so that the programme is written as:
where β is the discount factor, and k , d and ε represent next period's state variables.
The Decision to Loot. The dictator also has the choice to loot the economy's riches and exit. Conditional on looting, the dictator leaves with the maximum loan amount he can contract and the share of non-sunk capital w 0 = θ z Z + θ k k representing the current value of the liqueed natural and physical capital assets. It is assumed that the dictator absconds with this maximum amount of liquidity, without making any eort at retaining power, paying debts or investing in the economy.
On departure, he invests the looted sum to live o a constant ow of consumption c loot . The value of looting is then given by:
VLooting(k,d, ) Results. Obviously the dictator compares the payos from the two distinct options and chooses the strategy with the highest payo. Hence, the optimal solution solves:
where the value of staying v stay (k, d) and the value of looting v loot (k, d) are dened above. This amounts to an optimal stopping problem, where the decision to loot is an absorbing state.
As mentioned, if the decision is to loot, the optimal choice for the dictator is to set the level of loan at its maximum, invest nothing in the retention of tenure, and to depart immediately in pursuit of a lifetime of consumption (from looted lending). Given the decision to stay, however, the dictator's optimal choice for the next period's capital k , consumption c stay and next period's debt d is given by the following rst order conditions:
Equation (9) says that the dictator faces a trade-o when increasing capital stock: decreased consumption today versus an increased probability of remaining in power next period together with increased consumption tomorrow if power is retained or increased liquidity from capital in case of exit. The next condition (10) conveys the idea that the dictator chooses d in order to balance increased consumption today against decreased in consumption tomorrow due to debt servicing (if he stays the following period). Finally, equation (11) reects the fact that by choosing s the dictator will trade-o the utility loss from expending resources on retaining power against the benet from an enhanced security of tenure. These conditions are sucient to allow us to establish the basic comparative statics of the dictator's choice.
to be the net gain from staying relative to looting in any given period. For any given pair (k, d), the dictator's optimal choice is to stay if
The value function V (k, d) is increasing in k, Z, θ z and θ k , and is decreasing in d.
The gain from staying ∆V is decreasing in d, θ z and θ k , and non-monotonic with respect to k and
These results are derived formally in Appendix A. The intuition for most of the ndings is straightforward.
Aording higher liquidity to the dictator (increasing parameters θ z and θ k ) increases the opportunity cost of retaining power. The level of indebtedness reduces the relative returns to staying, since payment (by the dictator) is not required after looting. Increased security of tenure (reduced hazards) increases the relative returns to staying.
The non-monotonicity of ∆V with respect to k is determined by the relative productivity of capital versus the returns from liquefying capital.
4 If the marginal product of capital (discounted by the probability of preventing a coup) is greater than marginal liquidity of capital (in utility terms), i.e.
, then the relative gain of staying increases with the level of capital. If not, then the relative gain of staying decreases with k.
The reason for the non-monotonicity of ∆V with respect to Z depends on the relative impact of resources on production (terms 1 of equation (21) in Appendix A) and on the liquidity of resources provided by the banks (term 2 of equation (21)). If the return to liquidity is higher, then the gains from staying decrease, giving the the dictator more incentives to loot. On the other hand if the return of resources in the productive activities is relatively high, then the dictator has an incentive to stay.
As indicated in Proposition 1, the sign of ∆V , that is whether v stay is above or below v loot , depends on many of the parameters in the model (debt, liquidity, security). We wish to focus here on how the level of resource-based liquidity aorded to the dictator (θ z ) aects the autocrat's incentives to loot or to stay and invest in the economy. We commence by dening the critical values of collateral-based liquidity (θ z ) in terms of their impacts upon the dictator's incentives.
Denition:
, represented by the line tangent to v
, represented by the line parallel to v
in Figure 2 such that v
Note that v loot (θ z ) is the line passing the point at which the marginal product of capital and the marginal liquidity of capital are equal for a given θ k . Also, v loot (θ z ) is parallel to v loot (θ z ) and passes through the minimum of v stay at k = 0. In eect, the v loot iso-cline shifts upwards with increasing θ z and the critical values dene where it lies in relation to the v stay curve. This denition allows us to state our main result.
4 We have established in the proof in the appendix that:
Proposition 2: Value of looting as a function of liquidity
for a given d and θ k , then the dictator always loots irrespective of the level of k.
for a given d and θ k , there are two capital levelsk 1 andk 2 (withk 1 <k 2 ) such that the dictator stays for any k ∈ (k 1 ,k 2 ) and loots otherwise.
The dictator loots for any capital level abovek 3 and stays otherwise.
Proof: see Appendix B. 13 the optimal choice is to take any proferred liquidity and to loot the economy. Our main result is that increased liquidity will unambiguously increase the prospects for political instability and looting in a given state. That is, increases in the value of the parameter for resource-based liquidity (θ z ) raises the value of looting (shifts the v loot curve upwards).
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If the two curves potentially intersect, then the two values θ z and θ z separate the space into three regions: 1) Region I, for values of θ z located above θ z where looting is always optimal; 2) Region II for values of θ z between θ z and θ z where staying and investing is optimal within a specied (intermediate) range of capital levels; and 3) Region III for values of θ z below θ z where looting is optimal only for the highest values of k. This interaction between liquidity, capital and the incentives for looting provides the structure of the dynamics of the incentive system, and is investigated in the simulations in section 3.
The fundamental trade-o from the perspective of the dictator concerns the amounts currently appropriable from the economy (via liquidity and looting) and the amounts potentially producible The previous section demonstrated how the oer of resource-based liquidity provides an incentive system for the dictator, determining whether he will choose to loot, or invest in, the economy.
The results of Proposition 2 indicate that the incentives are dependent upon the level of capital 6 It is of course possible that, for particular parameter values, the two curves do not intersect anywhere in (v, k) space. This would be the case if either debt levels or security levels were so extreme as to render nancial contracting unimportant. In this instance we term the issue of nancial contracting non-critical, and we leave this case aside. Examples of such states might be the highly indebted states of sub-Saharan Africa or the extremely secure states of Arabia.
stock available within the economy (k), since this will determine both the expected productivity of additional increments to the capital stock as well as the capital for liquidation. For this reason, the system of incentives for looting may evolve along a particular development path, given a particular level of proerred liquidity. In particular, an economy commencing within Region II (in Figure   2 ) will initially commence with incentives for investment, but evolve into a situation where the incentives are for looting. In these circumstances the time of departure is endogenous, and a function of both liquidity and capital stock within the economy.
In this section we simulate the evolution of such an economy, given both low liquidity and high liquidity, to illustrate how a dictator will choose its date of departure by reference to the evolving system of incentives to loot. Initially the dictator will perceive high returns to initial investments in capital, and so stay and invest, but as successive increments to the capital stock reduce returns, the relative returns to looting may come to dominate.
Specication of the Model. To illustrate the dynamics of a resource-rich economy with optional liquidity-based looting, we simulate the model using the following functional forms: utility is specied as a CES function u(c) = c
, and the probability of losing power is an exponential function of the form ρ(k ) = exp(−λk ), where λ represents the dictator's eectiveness in preventing his demise. The production function takes the form
, where f < 0 and f < 0.
In the limit, output will tend to Y s . The value of staying and looting are then given by:
7 Simulation of Growth. In Figure 3 and Figure 4 we illustrate the impact of incentives for looting generated by rst low liquidity and then high liquidity in resource-based lending. Figure   3 demonstrates how, for low enough values of θ z , the incentives for investment inhere. Here the dictator views the productivity of the economy as his primary asset. Debt is exercised to its limit, but the dictator uses it for investment and in-place consumption. The regime does not change and capital levels reach the steady state optimum. In eect, the autocrat is acting as owner of the entire economy, and lending simply serves its purpose as a mechanism for shifting consumption across time. However, when θ z is high enough (doubled to 0.4 Z as in Figure 4 ), the dictator uses debt to pursue a hit and run strategy with regard to the economy. He accumulates capital to a point, but then loots as much of the capital and liquidity as is possible. This decision to loot is based on the dictator's comparison of the relative returns to further capital investments versus liquidity-based looting, which ip the incentives for the autocrat in the third period. This change in incentives for the dictator makes a big dierence for the economy concerned. A comparison of the two simulations reveals that capital in the looted economy moves to levels approximately 25% below that which occurs under the investment scenario (comparing Fig 3 and Fig 4 at period t3 ).
More importantly, the dynamics of the simulations reveal that the second economy never recovers from this initial looting. The fact that the new dictator (in t4) takes over an economy with higher debt levels means that the value of staying commences at a much reduced level. Looting becomes the optimal choice for this economy from then on. A series of incoming autocrats immediately loot the country's riches until debt reaches the ceiling, at which point banks are no longer willing to provide further liquidity. (see Figure 4 in periods t4 − t14) This economy is now caught in a debt trap of political instability and low growth, with its origins in the level of resource-based liquidity proered to the incoming autocrats.
These simulations demonstrate that an incoming autocrat may act as an owner or as a thief in regard to the economy, depending upon the level of liquidity on oer. Low levels of liquidity maintain the incentives to stay and to invest as the owner of the economy. The returns from control are secured by staying on the scene, maintaining control and securing the ow of returns from earlier investments. On the other hand, high levels of liquidity act as a prize to the winner of the contest for control, and create incentives for an ongoing system of hit and runs. The returns from control in this case are secured simply by winning the contest for control of the economy -then the banks pay the prize and the contest winner exits the stage. This may be illustrated by comparing the incentives of a relatively secure dictator (low hazard of displacement) in Figure 3 with those inhering under the conditions of an insecure ruler (high hazard rate) in Figure 5 . What is the impact of security of tenure on the incentive system facing the dictator?
8 If the dictator is able to secure his tenure (relatively high λ in Figure 3 ) then he has incentives to stay and invest in productive capital as owner. By contrast, if he is unable to secure his tenure (low λ in Figure   5 ), then the incentives are to loot. Since insecurity and and lending have the same impact on incentives, it is apparent that both have the capacity to turn an owner-ruler into a thief.
Case of low liquidity These simulations translate our basic model of autocratic choice into empirically observable outcomes regarding lending, political instability, and economic growth. We have demonstrated that excessive resource-based lending may be seen to induce political instability and result in poorly performing economies. We turn now to an empirical examination of these claims.
Empirical Model and Data
The key prediction of our model is that lending combined with resources contributes to looting and political instability and this in turn results in reduced economic growth.
Our model suggests that the following claims might be supported, which we intend to explore here: Claim 1) Lending based upon natural resource wealth will result in higher political instability.
Looting will increase when resource richness is combined with high levels of liquidity. This instability will in turn adversely aect economic growth in the autocratic resource-rich state.
Claim 2) Lending-induced political instability will depend upon the level of the nation's production.
Looting should be reduced at initial increments of income but, beyond some threshold, larger incomes should result in a greater incidence of looting.
Our primary objective in this section is to test these claims in regard to country-level data on lending, political and economic performance. We specify the econometric model as follows:
Following the literature on instability and growth (Ozler and Tabellini, 1991 and , political instability is dened as the propensity to observe government changes, be it constitutional or unconstitutional".
9 Consistent with model predictions, political instability (or 9 The main diculty in estimating the structural model developed in section 2 is that looting decisions as modelled in this paper are virtually unobservable to the analyst. For example, the occurrence of a leader's turnover may be a poor approximation for the looting decision as turnover often takes place for reasons independent of leaders' decision to leave power. Given the lack of data for our dependent variable to perform a structural estimation, we opt for a more modest approach, and test the predictions of the model using reduced form estimations. 10 We are interested in the indirect eect of resources and lending on growth due to political instability, that is:
We estimate equations (15) and (16) However, identication by functional form may be particularly weak (Arellano, 2006) . To improve the identication of the model, we impose an exclusion restriction. In particular we assume that 10 To check for robustness, we will use later the occurrence of a coup , and the turnover of veto players as alternative measures of instability.
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ethnic fractionalization aects the probability of turnover but is excluded from the growth equation.
The prior is that higher ethnic fractionalization may lead to more instability. This is consistent with Easterley and Levine (1997) who argue that ethnic diversity may aect economic growth through political instability.
Our data set runs from 1970 to 2000 and contains 61 countries that have been led by an authoritarian regime at some point since 1970 (see Table 1 ).
11 We are mainly constrained by the availability of data on external nance. The sample excludes six Arab Gulf countries (Bahrain, Kuwait, Iraq, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) due to lack of data on lending. It also excludes
Western countries and the former Soviet bloc. We use the variable polity2 from Polity IV dataset to indicate whether a regime is aurhoritarian. For any given year, a country with a polity2 score below 0 is considered authoritarian. A casual look at the data conrms some basic ndings highlighted in the literature. Figure 6 shows the evolution of average lending and resource rents between 1970 and 2000. The lending curve mirrors the resource rents curve. This supports earlier claims that international nancial markets lend money during commodity booms and restrict liquidity during busts. The evolution of these two indicators until the early eighties is clearly indicative of the boom-based borrowing capacity 11 For robustness check, we also use a set of 9 countries that have always been democratic since 1970.
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highlighted by Usui (1997) , and Manzano and Rigobon (2001).
Finally, we proxy for institutional quality with the fraction of people speaking a European language at birth introduced by Hall and Jones (1999).
Estimation Results
This section reports our estimation results and analyses the determinants of political instability and growth using full information maximum likelihood estimation. Our basic specications are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 . Panel A represents growth equation (15) and Panel B presents the results from turnover equation (16) . In column (2) of the growth equation, we control for country xed eects. Note that in both specications, the treatment equations (turnover equations) control only for regional dummies because xed eects probit would produce inconsistent estimates.
Two main ndings are apparent from our basic specications. First, in Panel B columns (1)- (2), the treatment equations show that the interaction term of resources and lending is associated with a higher likelihood of turnover and its coecient is highly signicant. This result indicates that greater lending to resource rich countries is associated with higher political instability. This nding is consistent with the prediction of the theoretical model that dictators of resource rich countries with easy access to external capital may choose to loot rather than invest, which leads to increased instability. Besides, the fact that the coecient of resource rents (main eect) is signicantly negative suggests that resources per se are not to blame for political instability.
Our second nding is that political instability is detrimental to growth consistent with Alesina et al (1996) see columns (1) and (2) in Panel A. The eect of political instability on growth is particularly large, negative and it is statistically signicant. In investigating the eect of instability on growth, we are typically interested in the indirect eect of lending on growth through instability.
This indirect eect is the product of the coecient of instability in the growth equation (α 1 ) with the partial eect of lending on the probability of turnover. For expositional purposes, we choose to vary lending by one standard deviation from its mean (respectively L and L + StdDev). All the other variables are set at their mean level. However, the value of the resource rent, ethnic diversity, per capita GDP are those of Nigeria a country with a high resource base. Equation (17) is then re-written as:
= α 1 P r(T urnover = 1|L + StdDev) − P r(T urnover = 1|L) 22 We nd in Table 3 that the eect of a one standard deviation increase in lending results in a decrease in economic growth by 0.68 and 0.82 percentage point for specications (1) and (2).
Together these two main results provide a strong evidence to support our theory. Lending to resource rich dictators raises the chance of political instability, leading to low growth.
The eect of the other explanatory variables will now be analysed. We nd that the per capita income tends to reduce instability (it has a negative and signicant eect both in columns (1) and (2)), while its square is positively correlated with instability. This suggests that beyond a certain level per capita GDP induces more instability. Finally, ethnic fractionalization is positively correlated with instability as expected.
We now turn to the eect of the control variables on growth. Investment is the main determinant of growth once xed eects are controlled for. A rise in the investment rate by 1% causes growth to increase by 0.10 and 0.18 percentage point. The ination rate is also an important predictor for growth: it is negative and signicant although its magnitude is fairly small. However, the eect of trade on growth is surprisingly negative.
12 This may be due to the fact that in our sample African countries, which experience the lowest growth performance, have also the highest GDP share of trade.
Finally, a Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the error term of the instability equation is uncorrelated with the error term of the growth equation. For example, in our basic specications, we obtain χ 2 (1) = 73.79 without xed eects in column (1) and χ 2 (1) = 78.64 with xed eects in columns (2) . This implies that the joint estimation of the treatment and outcome equations is required to generate unbiased estimates.
We now perform several checks to ensure the robustness of our ndings. First, there is a potential endogeneity bias for our main explanatory variables -lending and resource rent since both variables may be determined by political instability. We instrument them and their interaction with commodity price indices, US interest rates proxied by yields on 10 years bond, and the interaction of these variables. These variables are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables and are assumed to aect political instability only via those variables and not directly. We will use a control function approach which enables us to test directly the exogeneity of these variables in the political instability equation. The control function consists in a two-step procedure. In the rst step, we estimate the residuals of the reduced-form equation for resources, lending and their In the rst stage, we perform a heteroskedasticity-robust exogeneity test and nd that the set of instruments used for lending, resources and their interaction is jointly signicant in all three reduced form equations. Then, in the second stage we test the joint signicance of the residuals derived in the rst stage (see Table 4 ). The residuals are jointly insignicant as we obtain χ 2 (3) = 1.98 with p < 0.58. This nding shows that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these variables are exogenous.
As a second robustness check, we analyse the subsample of countries that have continuously been democratic since 1970 (see columns (3)- (4) of Table 2 ). We nd that the marginal eect of lending, although positive, is not statistically signicant. This suggests that the adverse relationship between lending and political instability is not present in democracies. There is however, a strong negative association between growth and leaders' turnover. A careful analysis of the data reveals that this is mostly due to the fact that in democracies, bad economic performance tend to be sanctioned during elections by the dismissal of the leader.
The third robustness check consists in using two alternative measures of political instability. In particular, we construct a dummy variable which indicates the propensity for a coup to occur.
13
The basic data comes from the Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive (Banks 2001 14 The results are presented in Table 5 and are consistent with our earlier ndings using turnover. 14 Instead of the turnover of the leader only, this database records the percentage turnover of veto players. In presidential systems, veto players are dened as the president and the largest party in the legislature, and in parliamentary systems, the veto players are dened as the PM and the three largest government parties. 24 6
Conclusion
This paper attempts to unravel a mechanism through which the much-discussed resource curse operates. Our main contribution is to show how credit market imperfections impact upon the choices of dictators in resource rich countries, which in turn leads to instability and slow growth.
In our model, a dictator makes a choice between staying and looting. Looting is facilitated when international banks are willing to turn natural capital into loans. The incentives for staying, on the other hand, result from the opportunity for taking advantage of the country's potential productivity while remaining in power. Key to the choice made by the dictator is his ability to prevent his own removal by political events such as coups or revolutions.
Our model suggests that the dictator will be fundamentally inuenced in this choice by the level of lending aorded by external banking institutions. The opportunity cost to staying and investing in the economy increases directly with any increase in the liquidity being aorded. The importance of restricting short term liqiuidity to aid the enforceability of loan agreements has been long-noted (Bulow and Rogo 1989) as has been the tendency of banks to ignore such advice. (Bulow 2002) The problem is argued to be one of moral hazard in the nancial markets, where banks fail to internalise the risks of default because of the belief that sovereign debts will ultimately be worked out and particularly those with large amounts of natural resources underlying them. The failure of the nancial sector to internalise these risks places these costs upon the peoples of the countries concerned.
We nd strong evidence to support our main prediction that unsound lending to dictators in resources rich countries results in instability, and ultimately in slower economic growth. Here, resources become a curse when imperfect domestic and international institutions (political and nancial markets) interact to produce political instability, which in turn impedes economic growth.
Poor lending practices is one channel to the resource curse.
There are many approaches advocated to deal with this sort of moral hazard. Bulow (2002) believes that the problem is sourced fundamentally in the intervention of external institutions in rescuing commercial banks from defaults. Banks engage in moral hazard in these lending practices on account of a fundamental failure of belief in the possibility of default. He recommends that banks should be made to execute loan agreements under domestic laws, enforceable only in domestic courts, in order to ensure that the debtor state's interests are taken into consideration. It is argued by some that advance due diligence in lending should be a requirement for the enforceability of the resulting debt. (Jayachandran, Kremer and Schafter 2006) One possibility is to require that any loans be more structured obligations, relying on specied investments rather than general assets.
This would ensure that banks required investments as a result of loans, and that these investments 25 were of a sort that could generate returns to the bank.
Finally, it may be more appropriate to encourage FDI rather than sovereign debt, again rendering recourse to domestic institutions necessary. All of these approaches may reduce the availability of debt in general, but our analysis indicates that this may be a good thing. 
Now it is clear that β (1 − ρ(k , s)) P r (χ = 1|k , d ) + β (1 − ρ(k , s )) P r (χ = 0|k , d ) < 1. It follows that the
That is the return to staying decreases as θ z increases.
Computation of (1 + r)(1 − β) (1 − β (1 − ρ(k , s )) P r (χ = 0|k , d ))
The rst term is positive while the second term is negative since the expression into the square brackets is negative as we have argued above. It follows that the eect of resources on the relative returns to staying is non monotonic. It depends on the relative impact of resources on the productive activity (term 1) and on the liquidity of resources provided by the banks (term 2). If the returns to liquidity is higher, then the gains from staying decreases, giving the the dictator more incentives to loot. On the other hand if the return of resources in the productive activities is higher, then the dictator has an incentive to stay.
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